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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A dispassionate reading ofl.AR. Rule 35(b)(3) indicates that a respondent is to provide 
a statement of the case to the extent it "disagrees with the statement of the case set forth in 
appellant's brief. It From a review of the first ten pages of the Ranchers' Brief, two things are 
apparent. First, their dissertation does not provide this Court with any explanation of any 
disagreement with the Cains' statement of the case. Rather, the Ranchers have simply taken an 
opportunity to assert many unverified allegations of their Complaint as the "facts" in this 
appeal. Second, the Ranchers' use of those unverified allegations as factual matters appears to 
be inconsistent with prior Court holdings. Evidence of facts presented to the court in support of 
a motion for summary judgment must be admissible evidence. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 
807,979 P.2d 1165 (1999). Presumably, the Court would prefer to operate from a fairly unified 
set of facts predicated on matters which are established by credible evidence. That is why any 
areas of disagreement that a respondent has with the facts as stated by an appellant should be 
recited in accordance with LAR. Rule 35(b )(3). 
Notwithstanding that the words "ranch", "land" and "livestock" are contained in their 
names, and notwithstanding that LAR. Rule 35(d) expressly compels a different approach, the 
Ranchers have expressly made it a point that they do not want to be called "Ranchers," but 
rather, prefer to refer to themselves as "Respondents", and to the Cains as "Appellants". Given 
the number of appeals considered by the Court, it is understandable why LAR. Rule 35( d) was 
adopted. Despite the objection contained in footnote 1 on page 1 of the Respondents' Brief, the 
Cains will continue to refer to them as Ranchers in this Reply Brief. 



























II. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. The Harris and Rindfleisch Affidavits. 
In oral argument, the Cains characterized the submission of the hand-written notes of 
the Ranchers' attorney as an anomaly because it would have the effect of making the affiant a 
fact witness in the case. Tr., 10113/2010 at p. 105, LL. 16-25. Judge Tingey did not exclude or 
strike the hand-written notes contained in the Harris Affidavit; rather, he concluded that, as far 
as he was concerned, the notes were "not probative. II If this Court is free on appeal to draw its 
own conclusions from the evidence presented, the probative value of the hand-written notes of 
the Ranchers' own counsel can be determined by this Court. From the Cains' perspective, those 
notes set forth a virtual roadmap of factual matters that support the Cains' arguments regarding 
a lack of necessity to support the Ranchers' eminent domain claim. The wisdom of including 
those notes is not at issue in this appeal, but their content is certainly relevant and probative. 
Although certain portions of the Rindfleisch Affidavit were stricken on the basis of a 
lack of foundation, his deposition was not. Paragraph 4 of the Rindlfeisch Affidavit stated: 
4. In 2005, Plaintiff Sorenson applied for a transfer of 
a water right with the Idaho Department of Water Resources that 
relied upon the use of the District's facilities. The District 
questioned the water right being transferred and was concerned 
about a possible expansion of the right. In response, the District's 
then-manager wrote a letter to IDWR advising it that no transport 
agreement existed for the water right and setting out other 
concerns. This response was not a denial of a transport agreement, 
but was rather a response to a request for transfer of a water right. 
To my knowledge, no request for a transport agreement for this 
water right has ever been filed with the District by Sorensen. 
Judge Tingey struck all of paragraph 4, except for the last sentence, on the basis of a lack of 



























foundation. Memorandum Decision and Order, R., Vol. 4, p. 677. 
Paragraph 6 of the Rindfleisch Affidavit stated: 
6. The transport agreements referred to in the 
Settlement Agreement of June 30, 2009, remained in effect during 
the 2009 irrigation season pursuant to the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement, and any termination of those transport agreements was 
at the request of the Plaintiffs, and not the District. It was my 
understanding that Plaintiffs terminated the transport agreements 
because they were unhappy with the conveyance losses resulting 
from the use of the District's system. 
Judge Tingey struck the entirety of paragraph 6 of the Rindfleisch Affidavit on the basis of a 
lack of foundation. Id. The Ranchers tacitly acknowledged that a proper foundation would be 
needed to overcome that objection. R., Vol. 4, p. 647. That is precisely what the Cains did. 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 56(e), the Rindfleisch Affidavit was supplemented by his 
deposition taken on December 3, 2010, following the entry of that Memorandum Decision. 
With regard to paragraph 4 of the Rindfleisch Affidavit, it is especially noteworthy that 
Sorensen's application, and the letter referenced therein, were both included in the record in 
another affidavit submitted by the Ranchers' counsel. R., Vol. 1, pp. 111-115. Mr. Rindfleisch 
testified in his deposition that, as the General Manager of the BLRlD, he was the custodian of 
the District's records and had reviewed documents in the District's files in order to gain personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth in his Affidavit. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 11, LL. 7-15; p. 11, 
LL. 23-25; p. 12, LL. 1-7. His responsibility of being the custodian of all the District's records 
and its property was consistent with the duties of the General Manager as set forth in the 
BLRlD Bylaws. Pursuant to those Bylaws, the General Manager is "to take charge of all 
property belonging to the .District" and "to have general charge of the distribution of water 



























furnished by the District to consumers and also general charge of the canals and laterals 
belonging to the District, and the care and maintenance of the same." R., Vol. 8, p. 14, LL. 27-
28. A quasi-governmental entity such as the BLRlD does not suffer from institutional amnesia 
because a new manager becomes custodian of its records. With regard to paragraph 6 of his 
Affidavit, Mr. Rindfleisch testified in his deposition that he was present at all of the meetings 
where settlement discussions with the Ranchers and the BLRlD Board were undertaken in order 
to arrive at the Settlement Agreement. Rindfleisch Deposition, pp. 14-16, R., Vol. 4, p. 794. 
Additionally, he was a participant in the Board's executive session meeting where the 
settlement was discussed leading to its ultimate execution. ld As a participant in all those 
meetings, he testified under oath in his deposition that there was no reason that the BLRlD 
would have wanted those two GW Transport Agreements with the Ranchers terminated, and 
that the two GW Transport Agreements were terminated at the request of Telford and PU 
Ranch. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 19, LL. 1-9, R., Vol. 4, p. 795. He testified that the two GW 
Transport Agreements were valid during all of2009. Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 18, LL. 4-6, R., 
Vol. 4, p. 795. He knew that Telford and PU Ranch reserved the right to utilize the two GW 
Transport Agreements "if the shrinkage was too bad when they put it in the [UC] CanaL" 
Rindfleisch Deposition, p. 21, LL. 12-25; and p. 22, LL. 1-7, R., Vol. 4, pp. 795-96. 
To the extent that a citation in the Cains' opening Briefhas referred to a stricken portion 
of the Rindfleisch Affidavit, it is apparent that Mr. Rindfleisch's deposition testimony 
established the requisite foundation for the statements he made. The Cains found only one 
reference to a stricken portion of the Rindfleisch Affidavit at p. 19, L. 16 of their opening Brief, 



























which reference was a parallel citation to the deposition testimony of Mr. Rindfleisch. Having 
attended all the meetings of the BLRID Board, including the executive sessions, the logical 
individual to testify on these matters was the District's General Manager. He testified that there 
was no reason why the District would have wanted those two GW Transport Agreements 
terminated; that those agreements were terminated at the behest of Telford and PU Ranch; that 
the Moore Canal had capacity to transport the Ranchers' water rights as it was doing in their 
five other transport agreements, and that the District was ready, willing and able to do so. 
Consistent with Bromley, supra, the Cains were entitled to produce the deposition of 
James Rindfleisch as admissible evidence in this matter. The Cains understand why the 
Ranchers are so adamant about not wanting Mr. Rindfleisch's statements considered, because 
they clearly establish the fact that the Ranchers were the ones who wanted those two specific 
GW Transport Agreements terminated in order to create an alleged necessity. The same is true 
for the attorney notes appended to the Harris Affidavit which were never excluded or stricken 
from the record by the court, contrary to the Ranchers' assertion. The notes clearly laid out the 
Ranchers' plan to "terminate existing GW [agreements]," and their need for two perpetual 
easements with the notations to "make sure," "only by," and "protect us." Simply stated, the 
Ranchers wanted just two of their seven transport agreements terminated, and they needed to 
make certain that they obtained perpetual easements through two landowners because a 
perpetual easement was the only method by which they could protect themselves. R., Vol. 3, p. 
447. Finally, the notes acknowledged that those two GW Transport Agreements would "sunset 
on their own @ end of this year." Id at p. 450. 



























B. Factual Matters and Due Process. 
As discussed above, the recitation of facts by reference to the Ranchers' unverified 
Complaint hardly seems appropriate. This case was first brought to the court on a Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction based upon that unverified Complaint. 
The transcript from that hearing discloses some interesting factual contentions that led to the 
court's issuance of the preliminary injunction. The Ranchers acknowledged that they had 
historically put their water into the Moore Canal in order to carry it to their property, but 
"decided that it would be in their best interests to construct a common pipeline." (Emphasis 
added). Tr., 511912010, p. 3, LL. 1-6. The Ranchers' "whole idea was to divorce themselves 
from the Irrigation District so that they could control their own water, control their own 
conveyance losses, do everything they needed to do." Id at p. 5, LL. 3-7. (Of course, it is 
apparent that their "divorce" was only a partial separation given the existence of the five other 
transport agreements that were in effect between the Ranchers and the District.) Despite the 
Harris notes indicating that perpetual easements over intervening land owners' property were 
the only mechanism by which the Ranchers could be protected, the Ranchers asserted to the 
court that they obtained some form of oral real property interest when Don Cain allegedly 
answered, "Absolutely," when Boyd Burnett asked if they could "put in this pipeline." Id at p. 
5, LL. 14-15. Don Cain's version of the facts differed markedly in that he stated that he advised 
Burnett to come back later to discuss it. Id at p. 14, LL. 13-15. That statement squared with the 
report from the Butte County Sheriffs Office. Id at p. 24, LL. 18-25; p. 25, LL. 1-5. Any 
suggestion that Mr. Cain verbally consented to the installation of a pipeline on his property, and 



























subsequently changed his mind, was certainly a disputed fact, contrary to the Ranchers' 
statement of facts contained in paragraph 4 on page 4 of their Brief. That difference was the 
basis for the district court's grant of the Cains' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count 1 of 
the Ranchers' Complaint. See Memorandum Decision at R., Vol. 4, pp. 683-84. The Ranchers 
did not cross-appeal that determination. The Ranchers have also included an erroneous 
"statement of fact" in that same paragraph that "if an easement document was necessary in the 
future, Appellants [Cains] would provide the same." That argument was also summarily 
rejected by the district court. Id. In his deposition, Mr. Burnett stated that Cain "did not want to 
sign an easement," and that "he didn't want to sell the property." Burnett Deposition, p. 22, LL. 
16-24, R., Vol. 1, p. 173. 
The Ranchers confirmed that they could have diverted their water into the Moore Canal 
in 2009 after the pipeline was constructed, but they chose not to do so. Tr., 5/19/2010 at p. 22, 
LL. 10-12. The Ranchers twice unabashedly asserted that their pipeline would not burden the 
Cains' property more than it had already been burdened. Tr., 5/19/2010 at p. 27, LL. 19-21; and 
p. 28, LL. 12-13. Finally, in arguing to the court regarding the burden to the Cains' property, the 
Ranchers asserted: 
And in terms of the burden to his property, if he has any 
imminent plans to develop it this year, then I think that might be an 
issue; but I don't think: he's indicated that today. He said sometime 
in the future he might. 
Id. at p. 31, LL. 10-14. The Cains can perceive no reason why there would be any difference if 
there was a development plan this year or ten years from now. It was still the taking of private 
property. 



























Despite the fact that the Complaint was not verified, that no witnesses were called, and 
that no evidence was introduced through witnesses, a preliminary injunction was entered by the 
court requiring the Ranchers' pipeline to remain in place on the Cains' property. 
At that point in time, the Cains decided they needed to obtain legal counsel to seek 
reconsideration of the preliminary injunction. R., Vol. 1, pp. 36-38. Although the Ranchers 
have asserted that due process issues in this case were never raised below, the Cains' brief on 
reconsideration of the preliminary injunction expressly referred to "due process," and cited 
Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965) in support 
of arguments in that regard. Id at p. 37, LL. 17-25. In addition to placing the issue squarely 
before the court in their written motion, the Cains also argued notice and an opportunity to be 
heard consistent with Lawrence, supra. Tr., 6116/2010, p. 55, LL. 2-13. The Cains' arguments 
were rejected, with the district court determining that it could enter a preliminary injunction 
without being required to take evidence of any sort. Id at p. 55, LL. 17-19. Additionally, the 
court concluded that a complaint need not be verified in order to issue a preliminary injunction. 
Id at p. 55, LL. 14-17. It is clear that the issue of due process was raised below, and consistent 
with Kolar v. Cassia County, 142 Idaho 346, 127 P.3d 962 (2005), as specifically cited in the 
Ranchers' Brief, this issue can be addressed on appeal. 
Throughout this case the Ranchers have unhesitatingly acknowledged that the pipeline 
was installed in June of 2009. Tr., 10113/2010, p. 75, LL. 11-12. Their Complaint was filed 
almost a year later on May 17, 2010. R., Vol. 8, p. 1274. The Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 



























No person shall be ... deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without 
due process oflaw ... . 
Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: 
No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process oflaw. 
The process of law for an eminent domain proceeding is outlined in Title 7 of the Idaho Code. 
The Cains argued to the district court that the process employed by the Ranchers was 
inconsistent, as a matter oflaw, with the requirements of Title 7. See, e.g., R., Vol. 5, p. 870, 
LL. 16-26. In Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 216 P.3d 130 (2009), this Court stated: 
When questions of law are presented on a motion for 
summary judgment, "this Court exercises free review and is not 
bound by findings of the district court but is free to draw its own 
conclusions from the evidence presented." Lettunich v. Key Bank 
Nat'l Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 366, 109 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2005). 
Thus, the Court independently reviews the trial court's resolution of 
"whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the 
prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Doe 
v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 
(2007)." 
147 Idaho at 846. 
Because due process issues were raised below, this Court should consider the arguments 
of the Cains on appeal with a logical conclusion that their due process rights were violated 
when the Ranchers trespassed on their property, and then obtained a preliminary injunction and 
an order of eminent domain without compliance with the relevant statutes. 
c. Easement vs. Water Right Issues. 
The Ranchers have devoted portions of their Brief to the argument that because the 
elements of a water right in an adjudication do not necessarily contain conditions of approval 



























for a water right application or transfer, such conditions are therefore rendered meaningless, or 
are simply mere suggestions. The Cains stand by their original arguments that the Ranchers 
have confused conditions of approval of permitted or transferred water rights with the elements 
of a decree as contained in Idaho's adjudication statutes. The Affidavit of Dr. Charles E. 
Brockway further explains the difference between (a) the elements of a water right in an 
adjudication and (b) conditions of approval for a water right. R., Vol. 5, p. 813 at ~~ 5 through 
9, inclusive. 
D. The Eminent Domain Issue. 
The Ranchers have gone to great lengths in their Brief to justify the court's holding that 
eminent domain was the appropriate remedy in this case. There is no dispute by the Ranchers 
that they first took the Cains' property approximately one year prior to their institution of 
eminent domain proceedings. There is no dispute that the Complaint did not contain a legal 
description of the property sought to be taken, and that the issue was first raised by the 
Ranchers at the reconsideration hearing heard by Judge Watkins. Tr., 4/20/2011, p. 21, LL. 16-
19. However, the issue of monetary damages was the only issue that was left for determination 
as indicated in the district court's Memorandum Decision, R., Vol. 4, p. 683. Counsel for the 
Cains noted the fact that lack of a legal description in the Complaint was raised for the first 
time during the oral argument on reconsideration. Id. at p. 38, LL. 9-20. There is no dispute that 
the Ranchers sought the court's judgment "determining that Twin Lakes is entitled to take the 
easement for the Pipeline subject to payment by Twin Lakes to Defendants of just 
compensation for the easement." R., Vol. 8, p. 1285, ~ 4. The crux of this case comes down to 



























the issue of necessity and the steps taken by the Ranchers to create their own necessity. After 
having their original pipeline forcibly removed from the BLRlD culvert and right-of-way, the 
Ranchers negotiated for the termination of two of their seven transport agreements. Some of 
those were for groundwater, and some of them were for surface water, and although the 
Ranchers have contended that there is a difference between ground and surface water to justify 
their position (Tr., 4/20/2011, p. 26, LL. 13-16), the Cains contend that the termination of those 
two transport agreements was a mere contrivance to create necessity. The Ranchers consistently 
acknowledged that they had historically conveyed their water via the Moore Canal, a condition 
of their water rights as more fully evidenced in the Cains' initial Brief. As argued by the 
Ranchers: 
So that was what the Court had said is that it would make a more 
efficient use of their water. Well, what does that translate into? It 
means that they can better irrigate their land; they can irrigate more 
acres, because they have more control over it. And that Your 
Honor is a necessity. 
Id. at p. 27, LL. 10-16. The GW Transport Agreements, the Ranchers concluded, were just not 
good enough for them. 
So the fact that this is used by permission only, it's a 
license, underscores the need for my clients to have something 
more than just permission from someone. They need their own 
easement, and that's why the pipeline was installed. 
Id. at p. 29, LL. 24-25; p. 30, LL. 1-3. That same argument was advanced by the Ranchers to 
Judge Tingey at the summary judgment hearing. 
Permission is not an option. We need to have our own property 
rights to give us the security that we need. 



























Tr., 10113/2010, p. 82, LL. 16-17. In Cohen v. Larson, 125 Idaho 82, 867 P.2d 956 (1993), this 
Court stated: 
This Court has never held that private individuals may take the 
property of other private individuals in order to enhance their 
purely private enjoyment of their property. 
125 Idaho at 84. In the instant case, it appears that is exactly what the Ranchers have done. 
The Ranchers have cited the Court to Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal 
Co., 101 Idaho 604,619 P.2d 122 (1980) for the proposition that the "irrigation and reclamation 
of arid lands is a well recognized public use .... " 101 Idaho at 607. Perhaps that is why the 
Ranchers want the Court to view them as "farmers" so they can be seen as though they are 
"reclaiming" their land from sagebrush to make it capable of producing crops in order to meet 
the purpose of the eminent domain statutes. For the record, the Cains note that the words 
"irrigation and reclamation" are in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive. Whether or not 
that be parsing the language too strictly, it seems that may be exactly what was contemplated at 
Idaho's Constitutional Convention, i.e., that arid desert land could be "reclaimed" and then 
irrigated to make it into productive agricultural land. In the case of In the Matter of Drainage 
District No.1 of Canyon County v. Farmers Cooperative Canal Co. and the Knobel Ditch Co., 
29 Idaho 377, 161 P. 315 (1916), the Idaho Supreme Court dealt with a drainage case. Although 
the facts of that case are dissimilar from the instant case, a statement by the Court is notable. 
It is a well-recognized fact that under many of the irrigation 
systems of our state thousands of acres of land which were 
reclaimed from an arid condition and which for a time produced 
valuable crops have now become alkalined or water-logged, and 



























thus ruined, and grows nothing but willows and tules because of 
the seepage of waters from canals and the irrigation of higher 
lands. 
(Emphasis added). 29 Idaho at 395. While the delegates to the Constitutional Convention may 
have wanted to secure the reclamation of arid lands for their future irrigation, it is doubtful that 
they ever contemplated a situation where someone who had a license for the conveyance of 
their water, and had used it for thirty years, could simply terminate that license in order to 
utilize eminent domain for purposes of obtaining a "superior delivery system" in order to 
enhance the enjoyment of their property. That is precisely what Telford and PU Ranch did in 
order to assert a claim for eminent domain. As for Sorensen, even though his water right 
contained a condition that it would be conveyed via the Moore Canal, he simply opted never to 
seek a transport agreement for his groundwater right, even though he possessed a transport 
agreement for his surface water rights. He testified under oath in his deposition that he "could 
not get a Transport Agreement from the Irrigation District to convey my water right." Sorensen 
Deposition, p. 46, LL. 10-12, R., Vol. 2, p. 307. However, he had to subsequently admit that he 
did indeed have other transport agreements with the BLRID in the Moore Canal. Id. at p. 55, 
LL. 9-11, R., Vol. 2, p. 309. He acknowledged having previously seen a copy of the letter from 
the BLRID which was attached as Exhibit "D" to the Affidavit of Don Cain and referenced 
therein at paragraph 13, R., Vol. 1, p. 24. A true copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". In that letter the BLRID stated that Sorenson's [sic - Sorensen's] water right could be 
conveyed in the Moore Canal pursuant to a transport agreement as had been done in the past. 
Sorensen admitted that he was aware that his water right had previously been transported via 



























the Moore Canal. Sorensen Deposition, p. 34, LL. 10-21, R., VoL 2, p. 304. He acknowledged 
that he was aware that his water right had been acquired with the indication that it was 
transported via the Moore Canal. Id at p. 35, LL. 4-9. He admitted that he never submitted a 
request for a transport agreement for his groundwater right. Id at p. 56, LL. 20-25, R., Vol. 2, p. 
309. He acknowledged that the pipeline was more convenient than the conveyance in the Moore 
Canal.ld at p. 46, LL. 5-8, R., VoL 2, p. 307. 
Cains renew their argument that mere convenience, and not necessity, was the basis for 
the Ranchers' decision to trespass upon the Cains' property for purposes of constructing a 
pipeline. The deposition of BLRID Manager James Rindfleisch makes it abundantly clear that 
the two GW Transport Agreements were terminated at the request of Telford and PU Ranch; 
that the District would have had no reason to terminate those agreements because they brought 
revenue to the District; and finally, that the District was ready, willing and able to transport 
these groundwater rights for the Ranchers just as they were doing under five other separate 
transport agreements with them. It is difficult to comprehend how the Ranchers could have 
asserted necessity on the basis of the "permissive nature and onerous provisions of the transport 
agreements" (Respondents' Brief at p. 27), while still availing themselves of the same 
provisions in other transport agreements. In their Brief, the Ranchers have attempted to 
distinguish between ground and surface water rights when it comes to transport agreements. 
(Respondents' Brief at p. 28). The Cains have always taken the position that "water is water," 
regardless of its source. A molecule of surface water being transported via the Moore Canal is 
no different than a molecule of groundwater. The Ranchers have disagreed, and have even 



























suggested that they may return to the courtroom for another round of eminent domain 
proceedings in the future relative to the transport of their surface water rights. 
However, acceptance of an inferior delivery system for the time 
being does not mean Respondents [Ranchers] would be prohibited 
from condemning an easement in the future for these [surface] 
rights as well. 
Respondents' Brief at p. 28. That statement is very telling. The Ranchers' "inferior delivery 
system" is working just fine, just as the two terminated GW Transport Agreements did over the 
past thirty years. In their quest for a "superior delivery system," they believe they should have 
the legal right to take someone else's property in order to enhance their property. 
E. Compliance with Title 7 of the Idaho Code. 
The Ranchers contend that they have complied with the requirements of Title 7 because 
they made an offer to purchase the easement on the Cains' property before filing their eminent 
domain Complaint. The problem, of course, is that the Complaint was filed approximately one 
year after they had already installed their pipeline on the Cains' property by trespass. According 
to the Ranchers' own arguments in support of their alleged good faith negotiation, they said, 
"Well, we've got a pipeline there. Can we purchase the easement from you?" Tr., 10/13/2010, p. 
75, LL. 22-23. Don Cain's rendition of his discussion with Mr. Telford was slightly different 
when he addressed the court at the preliminary injunction hearing: 
He [Telford] says, "We can give you $91 or we can file 
eminent domain." 
Tr., 5119/2010, p. 17, LL. 3-4. Both the U.S. Constitution and Idaho's Constitution provide that 
private property may not first be taken without due process of law. This Court has previously 



























held that a condemnor is not entitled to possession of the premises in an ordinary condemnation 
action until after commencement of the litigation. Lobdell v. State ex. ReI Board of Highway 
Directors, 89 Idaho 559, 407 P.2d 135 (1965). The Cains contend that the Ranchers failed to 
comply with Title 7 of the Idaho Code in that regard. 
The lack of a legal description in the Ranchers' Complaint has been thoroughly briefed 
by the Cains. The first time the issue ever arose was during oral arguments on the hearing for 
reconsideration. It is also very apparent that the Ranchers themselves acknowledged this 
shortcoming when they filed their Motion to Amend Complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 15(a) 
on October 5, 2011 (R., Vol. 6, p. 1109-1114), six days after the Judgment was filed. Id at p. 
1078. 
The Ranchers have offered no explanation as to why their prayer for relief sought an 
order of condemnation determining that Twin Lakes should be entitled to an award of an 
easement across the Cains' property through eminent domain proceedings. Suffice it to say, the 
Cains contend that the Ranchers have treated a very serious matter requiring strict compliance 
with the law as something that can be treated cavalierly. In McKenney v. Anselmo, 91 Idaho 
118,416 P.2d 509 (1966), this Court stated: 
The applicable rule of statutory construction is set forth in 
26 AmJur.2d, Eminent Domain, 18, pp. 659-661 and essentially is 
as follows: 
A grant of the power of eminent domain, which is one of 
the attributes of sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of 
abuse and injustice, will never pass by implication; and when the 
power is granted, the extent to which the power exercised is 
limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in 
which the grant is contained. In other words, statutes conferring 



























the power must be strictly construed. Clear legislative authority 
must be shown to justify the taking. Authority cannot be implied or 
inferred from vague or doubtful language. When the matter is 
doubtful, it must be resolved in favor of the property owner. 
(Emphasis added). 91 Idaho at 123. As Don Cain stated at the preliminary injunction hearing, 
"But I am here because this is important to me. This is my land. I worked all my life for what I 
have." Tr., 5119/2010, p. 18, LL. 11-13. It is abundantly clear that the Ranchers failed to comply 
with Title 7 of the Idaho Code. 
F. Standing of Telford Lands LLC. 
The Ranchers contend that Telford, as the lessee of a now-expired water bank lease, had 
standing to assert an eminent domain claim against the Cains. No law has been cited for the 
proposition that a lessee has standing to engage in an eminent domain proceeding. Given their 
recitation of the applicability of Canyon View Irrigation, supra, to the facts of this case, it 
appears that certain segments of that opinion have been ignored by the Ranchers. In Canyon 
View, the Court stated, "In order to assist owners of water rights whose lands are remote from 
the water source, the state has partially delegated its powers of eminent domain to private 
individuals." (Emphasis added). 101 Idaho at 607. Continuing, this Court stated: 
To condemn such a right of way, the water right owners 
must proceed under Idaho's law of eminent domain, found in I.C. 
§§ 7-701, et seq. 
(Emphasis added). Id. Telford testified in his deposition on July 12, 2012, that he had only a 
two-year water bank lease, but that prior to its execution, he had no point of diversion for any 
water rights in either the Old Moss Well or the P.D. Well. Telford Deposition, p. 22, LL. 22-25 
and p. 23, LL. 1-12, R., Vol. 2, p. 321. The Cains contend that Telford lacked standing to seek a 
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G. Attorney Fees Below. 
Had the prevailing party analysis been appropriately applied by the district court to the. 
three claims of the Ranchers that were rejected, the Cains would properly have been awarded 
their costs and attorney fees. Cains contend that it was erroneous to apply the prevailing party 
determination to the eminent domain proceeding, all as more specifically set forth in their 
opening Brief. If the Court reverses the trial court's decision on eminent domain, the Cains will 
clearly be the prevailing party. 
H. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Far from being an invitation for this Court to second-guess the evidence, the Cains 
contend that the review by this Court presents an opportunity to apply the facts and law to reach 
an entirely different resolution of the Ranchers' eminent domain claim. The Cains have asserted 
error on the part of the trial court in reaching a number of conclusions to establish the propriety 
of an award of eminent domain. The Ranchers have concluded their Brief by asserting that they 
were forced to file this lawsuit based upon Mr. Cain's action of self-help. These contentions on 
the part of the Ranchers seem a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. The Ranchers first 
trespassed and self-helped themselves by installing their pipeline on the BLRID right-of-way 
and in the BLRID culvert. When their trespass action resulted in the filing of a lawsuit by the 
BLRID, the Ranchers simply self-helped themselves a second time by trespassing on the Cains' 
property and installing their pipeline. Despite their own attorney's notes that the Ranchers 



























needed perpetual easements to protect themselves, the Ranchers took what they wanted through 
trespass, and then claimed a year later that they had a right to it through eminent domain. In 
other words, they made that bold, physical move to gain possession of a real property interest 
through their own forceful action. Given the facts of this case, attorney fees on appeal would 
appropriately be awarded to the Cains pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and I.A.R. Rule 41 in 
the event of a reversal of the district court's decision on the eminent domain issue. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In their own conclusion, the Ranchers refer to "the supenor system they have 
constructed" which has provided them "with their enhanced ability to farm." Respondents' Brief 
at p. 43. These statements in their Brief are consistent with the Ranchers' positions argued to the 
district court, i.e., a license agreement was not good enough for them, and they wanted their 
own "superior" real property interest. The Ranchers have acknowledged that the license 
agreements with BLRID have worked for thirty years, and further acknowledged that they are 
still operating with five other license agreements in the Moore Canal for the delivery of other 
water rights they hold. Given other statements in their Brief, the Ranchers appear poised to 
assert new eminent domain claims due to "an inferior delivery system" for their other water 
rights. Respondents' Brief at p. 28. With the deposition testimony of James Rindfleisch, it can 
only be concluded that the Ranchers voluntarily sought termination of two of their seven license 
agreements in order to invoke the theory of eminent domain. It was a matter of mere 
convenience and little more. As expressly acknowledged by the Ranchers in their own 
discovery responses: 



























Without all three partners involved, the project would not have 
been undertaken as the participation of all three individuals/entities 
was necessary to make the project economically feasible. 
R., Vol. 8, p. 1453. Telford admitted as much in his deposition when he stated that he needed 
partners to defray the cost of the project in order to make it all work. Telford Deposition, p. 22, 
LL. 10-21, R., Vol. 2, p. 436. 
In addition to their total failure to comply with Title 7 of the Idaho Code, the Ranchers 
have not established the requisite necessity to maintain an eminent domain proceeding. The 
decision of the district court on this issue should be reversed with instructions to enter judgment 
in favor of the Cains. The matter should be remanded for a determination of costs and attorney 
fees at the district court level. Attorney fees should be awarded to the Cains on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this kday of October, 2012. 
ROBERTSON &, SLETTE, PLLC 



























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the -t¥-day of October, 2012, he caused two (2) bound 
true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
Robert 1. Harris [ ] 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC [x] 
P.O. Box 50130 [ ] 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130 [ ] 
[ ] 




Facsimile Transmission - 208-523-9518 
Email rharris@holdenlegal.com 
BIG LOST RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
P.O. BOX 205' MACKAY, IDAHO 83251' (208)588-2231' FAX: (208) 
588-2863 
October 7, 2009 
Don Cain 
PO Box 927 
Moore, Idaho 83255 
Dear Don, 
This letter is a follow up to our phone conversation on October 6, 2009 
where you requested information on delivery of water from ground water 
right #34-13841 belonging to Mitch Sorenson. 
Water can be delivered from that well to the Moore Canal as it has been 
done in the past. When a well is pumped into a canal belonging to the Big 
Lost River Irrigation District (BLRID), a Transport Agreement with the 
BLRID is required. At present, this water right does not have a Transport 
Agreement and would require one in order to transport this well water to 
the place of use. It would also require an assessment be paid to the District 
for the land on which it is used. 
At present, there is an existing Transport Agreement for water rights #34-
2332 and #34-7079 belonging to PU Ranch LTD which historically has 
been used in the Moore Canal for transport of water to the place of use. 
These rights are pertinent to the same well as Sorenson partly owns. 
If there are any questions, please give me a call at 390-1447. 
co~-
James Rin eisch, Mgr 
Big Lost River Irrigation District 
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